as that there exist some or other states of Karl, of unspecified character, that realize such-and-such patterns of causal relations to one another and to such-and-such specified physical states. And in case the material parts of Karl interact with any psionic fields, astral bodies, entelechies, or what-not, then P must tell us the physics and the physical states of those things as well. Both Ao and Ak are to be specifications of Karl's propositional attitudes -in particular, of Karl's system of beliefs and desires. (I limit my attention to these attitudes in the hope that all others will prove to be analyzable as patterns of belief and desire, actual or potential; but if not, then whatever attitudes resist such analysis also should be included in Ao and Ak.) To specify the propositional content of Karl's beliefs and desires, we may specify how to express the believed or desired proposition, in some language, by a sentence in a context. Ao specifies Karl's beliefs and desires as expressed in our language; Ak specifies them as expressed in Karl's language; until we find out what the sentences of Karl's language mean, the two sorts of information are different. We take Karl's beliefs and desires to admit of degree, with the zero and unit of desire fixed arbitrari-ly. Also we allow them to vary with time. Thus Ao and Ak will consist of I believes) ascriptions of the form: Karl ~desires ~ ,to degree d, at time t, the proposit. 3 tion expressed, in context c, by the sentence '----' of [Karl's~ language.
Take this, if you wish, as a single relation between Karl, a degree (i.e. a number), a time, a context, and a sentence of our language or Karl's. I would prefer to take the seeming reference to a proposition at face value: Karl is related (to a degree, at a time) to a proposition, and that proposition in turn is related (in a context) to a sentence. For if our interest is in the philosophy of mind and of language, then the pursuit of ontological parsimony seems to me an unnecessary distraction. Propositions may be dispensable or they may not, but at least they seem harmless. True, Quine has rightly warned us againt the question-begging myth of the museum ( [16] : 27-29); but the myth begs questions not because it countenances propositions or other abstract entities, but rather because it uncritically takes for granted that our mental and semantic relations to these entities are determinate and need no explanation. M, the third component of our desired interpretation of Karl, is to be a specification, in our language, of the meanings of expressions of Karl's language. Primarily, M specifies the truth conditions of full sentences of Karl's language (perhaps relative to contexts of utterance). I leave it open, here, just what a 'truth condition' is; in particular, whether it should specify only the actual truth value of the sentence, or whether it should also specify what the truth value would be in various counterfactual situations not too remote from actuality, or whether it should specify the truth value at all possible worlds whatever. Secondarily, M specifies a way of parsing the sentences of Karl's language, the denotation or sense or comprehension or what-not of the constituents from which sentences may be compounded, and the way that the denotation (or whatever) of a compound depends on that of its constituents. In short, it specifies the syntactic and semantic rules of a grammar capable of generating Karl's sentences plus the truth conditions thereof.
It should be obvious by now that my problem of radical interpretation is not any real-life task of finding out about Karl's beliefs, desires, and meanings. I am not really asking how we could determine these facts. Rather: how do the facts determine these facts? By what constraints, and to what extent, does the totality of physical facts about Karl determine what he believes, desires, and means? To speak of a mighty knower, who uses his knowledge of these constraints to advance from omniscience about the physical facts P to omniscience about the other facts determined thereby, is a way of dramatizing our problem -safe enough, so long as we can take it or leave it alone. The real-life knower has all the problems of our fictitious knower, and more besides: he does not have all of P to draw on, and he may be limited in endurance, intelligence, or memory. (On the other hand, he does not aspire to omniscience about Ao, Ak, and M.) But these further obstacles to his investigation are irrelevant to our real topic.
IfI ask how P determines all the rest, my question requires the presupposition that P does determine all the rest. Or, at least, that P determines all the rest to the extent that anything does -that where determination by P leaves off, there indeterminacy begins. In other words, I am presupposing that there cannot possibly be two Karls exactly alike with respect to P but differing somehow with respect to Ao, Ak, or M. (It does not matter that there might be two equally correct ways to resolve some mental or semantic indeterminacy, so long as both ways are available for both Karls. The two Karls still do not differ.) This basic presupposition of our enterprise is a sort of minimal materialism. 'Minimal', first, because we have allowed P to include the physics of astral bodies or what-not if need be; and second, because even if all the mental and semantic facts about Karl are determined by the physical facts, it does not follow that they can be stated in the language of physics. (I think they can be, if the language of physics is taken fairly broadly, but that is another story.) What are the constraints by which the problem of radical interpretation is to be solved? Roughly speaking, they are the fundamental principles of our general theory of persons. They tell as how beliefs and desires and meanings are normally related to one another, to behavioral output, and to sensory input.
The general theory of persons serves as a schema for particular theories of particular persons. A particular theory of Karl, for instance, may be constructed by ascribing particular beliefs, desires, and meanings to him. That is: by filling in Ao, Ak, and M. But not just any filling-in will do. The relations of Ao, Ak, and M to one another and to P must conformfor the most part, more or less -to the principles of the general theory. Else the particular theory of Karl is inconsistent. In this way, the general theory provides the constraining power to make radical interpretation possible.
Our general theory of persons, like a term-introducing scientific theory, has a mixed character. On the one hand, it implicitly defines its key theoretical concepts: in particular, the concepts of belief, desire, and meaning. On the other other, it uses these concepts to make an empirical claim about human beings -a claim so well confirmed that we take it quite for granted. If we disentangle the definitional content and the empirical content, we have something roughly like this. Definitional content: something may count as a person's system of beliefs, desires, and meanings if and only if it is a system that more or less conforms to the principles of the theory. Empirical content: for any human being (with certain exceptions) there will exist a system of beliefs, desires, and meanings correctly socalled-that is, one that conforms to the principles. That is: almost whatever P may be, within the limits of human possibility, the problem of radical interpretation should have a solution.
The concepts of belief, desire, and meaning are common property. The theory that implicitly defines them had better be common property too. It must amount to nothing more than a mass of platitudes of common sense, though these may be reorganized in perspicuous and unfamiliar ways. Esoteric scientific findings that go beyond common sense must be kept out, on pain of changing the subject.
I have said, rather loosely, that the fundamental principles of our common-sense theory of persons implicitly define such concepts as belief, desire, and meaning. Actually, I would like to claim something stronger: that the implicit definitions can be made explicit (in the way I suggested in [8] , [10] , and [13] ), and that the explicit definitions so obtained would be analytic. If so, then our constraining principles would themselves have a status akin to analyticity: Karl might have no beliefs, desires, or meanings at all, but it is analytic that if he does have them then they more or less conform the constraining principles by which the concepts of belief, desire, and meaning are defined. But it would not be appropriate to press this claim here. For the question of whether analyticity is a legitimate notion is part of the broader question of the extent to which semantic facts are determinate, and that question is part of the very problem of radical interpretation that we are right now considering. I do not think I need to claim analyticity; it is enough that the constraining principles should be very firmly built into our common system of belief.
The principles that I would like to put forward as constraints on radical interpretation are the following six. They are not independent, and some may be entirely redundant given the others. On the other hand, I may well have overlooked important ones that should have been listed. of the Principle of Charity might just require that, so far as other constraints allow it, the beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl by Ao should be the same as our own beliefs and desires. "We will try for a theory that finds him consistent, a believer of truths, and a lover of the good (all by our own lights, it goes without saying)" as Davidson puts it ( [3] : 97). But it would be more charitable to make allowances for the likelihood that Karl's circumstances -his life history of evidence and training, recounted in physical terms in our data base P -may have led him understandably into error. We should at least forbear from ascribing to Karl those of our beliefs and desires which, according to P and our notions of reason, he has been given no reason to share. We should even ascribe to him those errors which we think we would have made, or should have made, if our evidence and training had been like his. Perhaps an improved Principle of Charity would require Karl's beliefs and ours to be related as follows: there must exist some common inductive method ~' which would lead to approximately our present systems of belief if given our life histories of evidence, and which would likewise lead to approximately the present system of beliefs ascribed to Karl by Ao if given Karl's life history of evidence according to P. As for desires: there must exist some common underlying system of basic intrinsic values o~ which would yield approximately our systems of desires if given our systems of beliefs, and which would likewise yield approximately the system of desires ascribed to Karl by Ao if given the system of beliefs ascribed to Karl by Ao, Diagrammatically: there must exist ,g and ~ such that:
P Ao
Karl's evidence our evidence ) Karl's beliefs, The Rationalization Principle constrains the relation between Ao and P:
Karl should be represented as a rational agent; the beliefs and desires ascribed to him by Ao should be such as to provide good reasons for his behavior, as given in physical terms by P. Thus if it is in P that Karl's arm goes up at a certain time, Ao should ascribe beliefs and desires according to which it is a good thing for his arm to go up then. I would hope to spell this out in decision-theoretic terms, as follows. Take a suitable set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions about Karl's behavior at any given time; of these alternatives, the one that comes true according to P should be the one (or: one of the ones) with maximum expected utility according to the total system of beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl at that time by Ao. A precondition: those ascribed beliefs and desires should be coherent enough to permit the comparison of expected utilities of alternative ways of behaving. (See, for instance, the exposition of decision theory in Jeffrey [7] ; or the less formal account of rationalization of behavior in Davidson [1 ] .) Would such use of the machinery of decision theory go against my requirement that the constraining principles should come from our commonsense theory of persons, not from esoteric science? I think not. Decision theory (at least, if we omit the frills) is not esoteric science, however un-familiar it may seem to an outsider. Rather, it is a systematic exposition of the consequences of certain well-chosen platitudes about belief, desire, preference, and choice. It is the very core of our common-sense theory of persons, dissected out and elegantly systematized. The same goes for my previous mention of underlying inductive methods and systems of basic intrinsic values: to the extent that unfamiliar theories are involved, they are not scientific theories but philosophical systematizations of parts of the common-sense theory of persons. The machinery derived from such systematizations is common property, whether or not the accompanying jargon is.
There is an ambiguity in the term 'behavior'. Note that I am using it to refer to raw behavior -body movements and the like -given by P alone; not to refer to behavior specified partly in terms of the agent's intentions. The latter is given jointly by P and Ao. That Karl's fingers move on certain trajectories and exert certain forces is what I call 'behavior'; that he signs a check is not. If anyone prefers, however, we could restate the Rationalization Principle in terms of the second sense of 'behavior': the beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl by Ao should be such as to provide good reasons -preferably, decision-theoretic explanations -for his nonraw behavior as given jointly by P and Ao. (This second version would fit better the account of rationalization in Davidson [1] .)
The Principle of Truthfulness constrains the relation between Ao and M:
Some of the beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl by Ao -in particular, some of those that pertain to speech behavior or responses to it on the part of Karl and his usual partners in conversation -should constitute Karl's part of the pattern of attitudes that I have elsewhere ( [9] , [12] ) called a convention of truthfulness in Karl's language, under the truth conditions assigned by M to sentences thereof. For instance, if M assigns to 'Ionlay!' the truth condition that a lion is present, then some of the beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl by Ao should be as follows: (1) a desire not to utter 'Ionlay!' unless a lion is present; (2) a belief that his partners have a like desire; (3) a belief that a lion is present, at times when he hears 'Ionlay!' uttered; (4) a belief that his partners respond in the same way to utterances of 'Ionlay!'; (5) a belief that his partners expect him to have the beliefs and desires (1)-(4), or at least that they have no contrary expectations about him; (6) a belief that they expect him also to have the belief (5), or at least that they have no contrary expectations; and so on. (Rather similar constraints on the relations between Karl's attitudes and his meanings could be taken from the discussions of meaning in Grice [6] , Schiffer [14] , or Stenius [15] .)
The Principle of Generativity constrains M: M should assign truth conditions to the sentences of Karl's language in a way that is at least finitely specifiable, and preferably also reasonably uniform and simple. Perhaps we may add that it should do so by means of syntactic and semantic rules that fit some standardized format: the format of a Tarski-style truth theory, as proposed by Davidson in [2] and elsewhere; or a categorically based transformational grammar with intensional semantic functions, as I propose in [11 ] ; or the sort of semantically based grammar proposed by some transformational grammarians, with some sort of specification of truth conditions for the base structures.
The Manifestation Principle constrains the relation between P and Ak, and to a slight extent also Ao: Karl's beliefs, as expressed in his own langnage, should normally be manifest in his dispositions to speech behavior. The sentences (in context) that he could be made to utter should normally be among that express propositions that he believes to a high degree. So unless Ao ascribes to Karl some special reason for deception or secrecy, it should be possible to read offthe beliefs in Ak from the dispositions-toutter given in P. (I do not see quite how to state a companion Manifestation Principle for the desires in Ak, but I rather think that there should be one.)
The Triangle Principle constrains the three-way relation between Ao, M, and Ak: Karl's beliefs and desires should be the same whether expressed in his language or in ours. Suppose that M assigns a certain truth condition to a sentence s (in context c) in Karl's language, and suppose that a sentence s' (in context c') of our language has the same truth condition.
Then if M is correct (and assigns truth conditions of a sufficiently rich sort), we ought to be entitled to regard s (in c) and s' (in c') as expressing the same propositions in their respective languages. If so, the status of s (in c) in Ak should be the same as that ofs' (in c'), in Ao: ifAk ascribes to Karl a certain degree of belief in the proposition expressed by s (in c), then Ao should ascribe to him the same degree of belief in the proposition expressed by s' (in c'), and likewise for Karl's degrees of desire.
How might we use these six constraining principles to solve the problem of radical interpretation? (I still mean the unreal problem of advancing from omniscience about P alone to omniscience also about Ao, Ak, and M.) I should like to contrast three rather different methods.
Method i is meant to borrow as much as possible from discussions of radical interpretation in Davidson [3] , [4] , and [5] . Davidson's problem of radical interpretation is not the same as mine, but can be treated as a sub-problem of mine. Given Karl's beliefs as expressed in his own language (part of Ak), Davidson asks how to solve both for Karl's beliefs as expressed in our language (part of Ao) and for the truth conditions of full sentences of Karl's language (part of M). As a by-product we may also get parsings of Karl's sentences and some sort of meanings for their constituents (the rest of M), since these are needed to play an auxiliary role in generating the truth conditions of the full sentences. Davidson's suggested method of attacking this sub-problem (which he regards as only a sketch of the main features of a fully adequate method) is to fill in the beliefs in Ao and the truth conditions (and auxiliary machinery) in M simultaneously, subject to three constraints: the Triangle Principle, and the Principles of Charity and Generativity. We must strike a balance as best we can between the demands of Charity on Ao and the demands of Generativity on M; it is not to be expected that we can satisfy both constraints perfectly.
To incorporate Davidson's method of solving the sub-problem into a method for solving my problem of radical interpretation, we must first use the Manifestation Principle to fill in the beliefs in Ak. But for that we need some input from Ao: so we must proceed by successive approximations. Method 1 goes as follows.
First step: fill in Ao, tentatively, by means of the Principle of Charity. We may or may not draw on P at this point; it depends on which version of the Principle of Charity we use.
Second step: using the tentative filling-in of Ao to exclude the cases in which Karl seems to have reason for deception or secrecy, and using Karl's dispositions to speech behavior as given in P, fill in the beliefs in Ak by means of the Manifestation Principle. This brings us up to the beginning of Davidson's sub-problem.
Third step: simultaneously revise the beliefs and Ao and fill in M, in such a way that the Triangle Principle is satisfied and a satisfactory balance is struck between the demands of the Principle of Charity on the beliefs in Ao and the demands of the Principle of Generativity on M.
Fourth step: using Karl's behavior of all sorts, as given in P, and using the revised beliefs in Ao, revise the desires in Ao by means of the Rationalization Principle. Then fill in the desires in Ak by means of the Triangle Principle. This gives a complete, but tentative, solution.
Fifth step: see whether the subsequent revision of Ao would have made any difference to the outcome of the second step. If so, start over at the second step using the revised Ao; if not, a stable solution has been reached. If the outcome at the second step is not too sensitive to the details of Ao, and if the revision of Ao at the third and fourth steps is not too great, then we may hope for a stable solution after not too many rounds of iteration. I doubt the adequacy of Method 1 ; mostly because it wastes the constraining power of the Principle of Truthfulness, but also because it fails to constrain the ascribed beliefs in Ao, as well as the desires, by means of the Rationalization Principle. Too much emphasis goes to language as a vehicle for manifestation of belief and belief as manifest in language; not enough either to language as a social practice or to belief as manifest in non-linguistic behavior. It may well be that my full problem of radical interpretation (for Karl, or in general) does have a fairly determinate solution by virtue of the constraints that are left out of Method 1, and yet that Davidson's sub-problem -the problem that has to be solved as the third step of Method 1 -is severely indeterminate if taken by itself.
Method 2, the method I am inclined to favor, is almost opposite to Method 1 in its plan of attack. The idea is to start by securing Ao, go on to M, and fill in Ak only at the end. If we proceed in that order, Davidson's sub-problem never arises. Two other sub-problems arise instead: the problem of determining Karl's attitudes (as expressed in our language) on the basis of certain of the physical facts about him, and then the problem of determining his meanings on the basis of certain of these attitudes. I hope that these are sub-problems that can safely be taken by themselves, without loss of determinacy. Method 2 goes as follows.
First step: using P both as a source of information on Karl's behavior and as a source of information on his life history of evidence, fill in Ao completely by means of the Rationalization Principle and the Principle of Charity. No special attention is given to Karl's language at this step; his speech behavior is merely included along with all the rest of his behavior to be rationalized.
Second step: using Ao to give information about those of Karl's attitudes that pertain to speech behavior, fill in M in such a way that, first, the relation of these attitudes to the truth conditions of the full sentences conforms to the Principle of Truthfulness; and second, the demands of the Principle of Generativity on the truth conditions and auxiliary apparatus of M are satisfied as well as they can be.
Third step: given Ao and M, fill in Ak by means of the Triangle Principle. (The Manifestation Principle should then be satisfied automatically; it is redundant, given the Principle of Truthfulness, the Rationalization Principle as applied to speech behavior, and the Triangle Principle.) This completes the solution.
Method 3, finally, is the obvious holistic non-method: try to fill in Ao, Ak, and M all at once, satisfying all six of our constraining principles or balancing them off as best we can. That is the method we would have to fall back on if we decided that no sub-problem could be separated out without loss of some determinacy, and hence gave up hope of solving the full problem step by step. That would be no great defeat. Our fictitious mighty knower will not mind trying all possible complete solutions to find out which are the ones that fit the constraints! After all, we are not really interested in a practical method of finding out anything; we are interested in the determination of the mental and semantic facts by the physical facts via the constraining principles. Plans of attack and the determinacy of various sub-problems are side issues.
The things that matter are: (1) what the problem of radical interpretation is; (2) the set of constraints by which it is solved, and the source of their constraining power; (3) the presupposition that the physical facts determine the mental and semantic facts, somehow, to the extent that anything does; and (4) the extent of the determinacy.
As regards the extent of determinacy, all that I have said so far is meant to be neutral between optimism and pessimism. I have only tried to say what a solution to the problem of radical interpretation is -namely, a filling-in of Ao, Ak, and M-and what constraints it must satisfy to be correct. That leaves it open whether there is one correct solution or many; and, if many, how different two correct solutions can be.
Indeterminacy might come in more or less virulent forms. It is worth distinguishing, for the worst sort is also the least credible -by my lights, always far less credible than the hypothesis that we have misconceived the whole problem! It seems hopeless to deny, in the face of such examples as those in [16] :
30-39, that the truth conditions of full sentences in M do not sutfice to determine the rest of M: the parsings and the meanings of the constituents of sentences. At least, that is so unless there is something more than our Principle of Generativity to constrain this auxiliary syntactic and semantic apparatus. It also seems hard to deny that a more general indeterminacy can arise because no solution fits all the constraints perfectly, and many different ways to strike a balance give many different compromise solutions. The 'unsharp analyticity' of some so-called definitions in physics, or the confused desires of a compulsive thief, might exemplify this indeterminacy of compromise.
Grant these two sorts of indeterminacy, and set them aside. Could indeterminacy of beliefs, desires, and truth conditions also arise because two different solutions both fit all the constraints perfectly? Here is the place to hold the line. This sort of indeterminacy has not been shown by convincing examples, and neither could it be shown-to me-by proof. Credo: if ever you prove to me that all the constraints we have yet found could permit two perfect solutions, differing otherwise than in the auxiliary apparatus of M, then you will have proved that we have not yet found all the constraints.
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